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SURVEY OF
A DECADE OF DECISIONS
ON THE LAW OF OBSCENITY t
JOHN CORNELIUS HAYES':*

P ERCEPTIVE

NON-LAWYERS are asking: "What is happening to the
law of 'obscenity? What are the lawyers and judges doing to it? It
appears that the legislatures and the executive agencies are trying to do
a good job of controlling a social evil, but they are being frustrated by
judges and lawyers. Every time we read the papers these past few years,
some obscenity law has just been upset. Now we're getting upset. We
have children, and the sex environment in this country is getting pretty
intrusive. It wasn't like this when we were kids; there wasn't any trouble enforcing laws against obscenity then. The federal constitution
hasn't changed. So what's happening?"
In trying to answer that question for lawyers and non-lawyers alike,
it will be useful to survey the principal cases of the past decade. They
will show that the non-lawyers are correct: there has been nothing like
the past ten years in the history of what Mr. Justice Brennan describes
as a universal agreement that obscenity should be legally restrained.
American legislatures at municipal, state, and national levels have long
since acted to impose such legal restraints. Their action demonstrates
their belief that obscene materials in fact existed in their political unit
in appreciable quantities, at popular prices, and with ready accessibility
to the general public; the materials therefore constituted a significant
social evil (and not merely an occasion of sin for individuals), which
A.B., Georgetown University; J.D., Loyola University; Litt. D., Aquinas College. Dean and Professor of Law, Loyola University School of Law.
t This article was originally written for oral delivery at a dinner concluding a
one-day conference of federal, state and local officers concerned with the enforcement of laws on obscenity in the New England States area, sponsored by the
Rhode Island State Youth Commission at Newport, Rhode Island, in October
of 1961, under the direction of Mr. Albert McAloon, the Executive Director

of the Commission. A substantial number of those in attendance were nonlawyer professional people. The talk was intended to be informal and was addressed to both the lawyers and the non-lawyers in the audience. The writer
has elected to maintain the same approach in this article because of the utility
which the article may have for the many non-lawyers in local citizens' groups
throughout the country.
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social evil adversely affected the general
welfare of their community. They must
also have thought that the particular form
of legal control which they devised was
practical, that the public would support it,
and that it would in fact control the social
evil without at the same time creating
other social evils equally damaging to the
general welfare of their community. Only
during the past decade have these laws
been shattering on the rock of the federal
constitution. The fact is that today the
federal constitution as presently construed
has made the law a slender reed indeed
on which to lean for the effective social
control of the universally conceded social
evil of obscenity.
The truth is that, under the federal constitution today, the protection which American law can afford against the social evil
of obscenity is minimal; on the other hand,
there is still some.
To answer the question of what is happening to our laws on obscenity, one
would, the writer thinks, start in 1952
with the case of Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v.
Wilson' which litigated, among other issues, the federal constitutionality of a
New York film licensing statute which directed that certain types of films should
not be licensed for public exhibition: those
which, in whole or in part, were obscene,
indecent, immoral, inhuman, corruptive
of morals or incitational to crime, or sacrilegious. The film "The Miracle" was refused a license for being sacrilegious, and
the United States Supreme Court held that
the state law which directed such refusal
was in violation of the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment, because the
adjective "sacrilegious" was unreasonably
' 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
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vague when used to control forms of communication within the guarantees of free
speech and free press in the first amendment. For the first time, this case brought
films, which were being subjected to state
licensing control, within the protection of
the federal constitution, thereby overruling
a 1915 decision in Mutual Film Corp. v.
Industrial Comm'n 2 that films which were
being subjected to state control were not
within the protection of the federal constitution. The focus of both cases is usually said to be whether films constituted a
form of free speech within the protection
of the first amendment; in 1915 the answer had been no, but in 1952 it was yes.
But even if the answer in 1915 had been
yes, the same result as that reached in
Mutual Film might still have been reached,
because the "due process" clause of the
fourteenth amendment had not then been
construed to impose upon states the same
restrictions in respect of free speech which
the first amendment imposed upon the federal government. This was a development
which did not occur until Gitlow v. New
4
York 3 ten years later.
2236 U.S. 230 (1915).

'268 U.S. 652 (1925).
Nor does it seem to have occurred to anyone
in 1915 that, though films were not a federally
protected form of free speech, the state laws
might still be in violation of the fourteenth
amendment's due process clause, not for infringing on free speech, but for being so vague
and indefinite in describing films which would
not be licensed as to make it unreasonably
difficult for a film producer or exhibitor to determine for himself whether his film would or
would not be licensed, so that his property, if
not licensed, could be regarded as having been
taken by the state laws without due process. In
the later Burstyn case, this view of the possible
operation of the due process clause seems to
have been accepted only because the films were
first held to be a form of speech within the
protection of the first amendment.
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As a result of the Burstyn decision, for
five years after 1952 the protectors of free
speech had great sport sniping at adjectives in state film licensing statutes which
had gone unchallenged for thirty-five
years, but which were now suddenly obsolete because they described movies in terms
which were unconstitutionally vague and
indefinite. The attack expanded to pick
up similar flaws in laws relating, not to
movies, but to publications and even to
live stage presentations, all of which had
always been within the ambit of constitutionally protected free speech. The first
decisions were in the federal courts, but
later, of course, state supreme courts fell
into line on the federal issue.
5
For example, in Gelling v. Texas, a
Texas statutory phrase "prejudicial to the
best interests of the people" proved too
vague. In Superior Films, Inc. v. Department of Educ.j an Ohio statute failed for
vagueness by requiring licensable films to
be of a "moral, educational, or amusing or
harmless character." In Commercial Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the University
of New York,' New York failed again for
vagueness with the adjective "immoral"
and the clause "would tend to corrupt
In Holmby Prods., Inc. v.
morals."
8
Vaughn, a Kansas statute failed for vagueness on the phrase "obscene or immoral."
In Hallmark Prods., Inc. v. Carroll,! Pennsylvania's Supreme Court struck down for
vagueness the whole following litany:
5 343

U.S. 960, reversing per curiam 157 Tex.

Crim. 516, 247 S.W.2d 95 (1952).
6 346 U.S. 587 (1954), reversing per curiami 159
Ohio St. 315, 112 N.E.2d 311 (1953).
7346 U.S. 587 (1954), reversing per curiam 305
N.Y. 336, 113 N.E.2d 502 (1953).

"sacrilegious, obscene, indecent or immoral or such as tend to debase or corrupt
morals."
It was at this stage, in mid-1957, when
legislators were beginning to wonder
whether even Roget's Thesaurus could
come up with a constitutionally definite
adjective or adjectival phrase, that the
celebrated consolidated cases of Roth v.
United States and Alberts v. California
were decided by the United States SuAn adequate adjective
preme Court.'
not alone
found-adequate
finally
was
when applied to movies but even when applied to publications, and adequate as well
in state as in federal laws. It was the single, simple adjective "obscene." It had
appeared before both in the Holmby and
Hallmark cases, but conjoined to inadequate words and not in stark solitude.
The Roth-Alberts decision must be explored in detail because it is indeed a landmark decision in the recent history of the
law of obscenity - the primary basis for
such minimal protection as the law can
extend to a community, conformably to
the federal constitution.
In the Roth case, Mr. Roth was indicted
by a federal grand jury on twenty-six
counts which charged him with the knowing deposit in the mails of certain publications declared by Congress to be nonmailable - namely, obscene advertising
circulars and an obscene book - all in
violation of a federal obscenity statute
prohibiting the knowing deposit for mailing of (among other things) any obscene,
lewd, lascivious or filthy book or other
publication of an indecent character. The
defendant was tried by a jury in the Federal District Court for the Southern Dis-

8 350 U.S. 870, reversing per curiam 177 Kan.

728, 282 P.2d 412 (1955).
9 384 Pa. 348, 121 A.2d 584 (1956).

n"354 U.S. 476 (1957).
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trict of New York and convicted on four
of the twenty-six counts. He appealed to
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which affirmed his conviction. 1 The
United States Supreme Court then granted
his petition for writ of certiorari and
2
brought the case up for final review.
In the Alberts case, Mr. Alberts was
conducting in the Los Angeles area a mailorder business of selling books, which
books he advertised solely by mailed circulars. A complaint was filed against
Alberts charging him under the California
Penal Code with the misdemeanor of wilfully and lewdly keeping for sale certain
obscene books, and of writing and publishing an obscene advertisement of those
books. Alberts waived a jury and was
convicted in a bench trial in the Municipal
Court of the Beverly Hills Judicial District. He appealed to the Appellate Department of the Superior Court of California in and for the County of Los
Angeles, which affirmed his conviction."
The United States Supreme Court then
noted probable jurisdiction and took the
case for final review of the federal consti4
tutional issues raised below.1
Because the principal federal constitutional issues raised in each case were the
same, the Supreme Court consolidated the
cases for oral argument and for decision.
By a vote of 6-3 in the Roth case and of
7-2 in the Alberts case, the convictions
were affirmed in a decision delivered for

11Roth

v. United States, 237 F.2d 796 (2d Cir.

1956).
12Roth v. United States, 352 U.S. 964 (1957)
(per curiam).
13 People v. Alberts, 138 Cal. App. 2d 909, 292
P.2d 90 (1956).
14 Alberts v. California, 352 U.S. 962 (1957)
(per curiam).

1962

the majority by Mr. Justice Brennan. 15
Mr. Justice Brennan noted that in neither case was there any issue presented as
to the obscenity of the material involved,
i.e., the application of the respective obscenity statutes. to the materials involved
was in effect conceded. The only issues,
then, related to the federal constitutionality
of the obscenity statutes themselves. Two
of these federal constitutional issues were
common to both cases; in addition, each
case presented one further individual constitutional issue.
The two common issues were characterized by Mr. Justice Brennan as primary
and secondary:
(1) The primary common issue was
whether the respective criminal statutes
regulating obscene publications violated
the freedoms of speech and press protected
against federal encroachment by the first
amendment and protected against state encroachment by the fourteenth amendment.
(2) The secondary common issue was
whether the respective criminal statutes
regulating obscene publications violated
the due process guaranteed by the fifth
and fourteenth amendments respectively,
in that the word "obscene" described the
prohibited publication too vaguely to serve
as a proper standard for criminal conduct
because the word did not mean the same
thing to all people everywhere and all the
time.
The additional individual issue* in the
Roth case was whether the federal obscenity statute violated the ninth and tenth
amendments in that the power to regulate
15The Chief Justice concurred in the result of
each case. Mr. Justice Harlan concurred in the
Alberts case, but dissented in the Roth case.
Mr. Justice Douglas dissented in both cases, in
which dissent he was joined by Mr. Justice Black.
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obscenity was not delegated to the federal
government but was reserved to the states
or to the people. Parenthetically, the Court
rejected this contention on the ground that
the federal power to control obscenity was
reasonably incident to the express federal
power over mails and commerce.
The additional individual issue in the
Alberts case was that the federal obscenity
statute pre-empted the whole field of control of obscene publications in relation to
the mails, so that the California statute, if
applied to this strictly mail-order defendant, would violate the supremacy clause of
the federal constitution. Parenthetically
again, the Court rejected this contention
on the ground that the California statute
covered many areas of conduct not covered by the federal statute and did not
interfere with federal control of the mails.
In raising the common issues, the defendants' sequence of thought was this:
(1) There is no legal definition of "obscene" sufficiently definite (and sufficiently
amplified by standards for the guidance of
enforcement officials) to comply with the
constitutional requirement of due process
in a criminal proceeding.
(2) Even if there were such a definition of "obscene," all publications (whether
obscene or not) come within the scope of
the freedoms of speech and press protected
directly or indirectly by the first amendment. As so protected, there is only one
way to justify their restraint and that is by
proving that they pose a critical danger of
antisocial conduct. 16 No such proof has

been made, if indeed any such proof can
ever be made.
As noted, for Mr. Justice Brennan and
the majority, the dispositive question was
whether obscenity is utterance within the
area of first amendment-protected freedom
of speech and press. To that question, he
gave the answer: "We hold that obscenity
is not within the area of constitutionally
protected speech or press."" And the reasons he gave were three:
(1) As a matter of legal precedent,
though the Supreme Court had never
squarely so held, in several prior cases it
had assumed that obscenity was not within
the protection of the first amendment.
(2) As a matter of constitutional history, the unconditional wording of the first
amendment was not intended in 1791 to
protect every utterance without exception.
Specifically, in 1791, obscenity was outside the pale, as were libel, and profanity
or blasphemy.
(3) As a matter of functional operation, first amendment protection of speech
and press was designed to assure the unfettered interchange of ideas for effective
political and social change demanded by
the people. Hence, all ideas having even
the slightest redeeming social importance
are protected, no matter how controversial,
unorthodox, or hateful to prevailing opin-

16 The phrase "clear and present danger" was
used, but the writer avoids the phrase because

priate restraint: if it can be proved that the protection afforded by the first amendment to the
exercise of one of its preferred freedoms will
clearly cause imminent danger to social causes
which, under given unusual circumstances, are
even more important to the common good, then
the normally preferred and protected freedom
must submit to such restraint as is reasonably

it may introduce a needless distraction as to the
present status of that "doctrine." The relevant
point here is simply that the Court has held that
there are situations in which even first amendment-protected freedoms must submit to appro-

preservation of the more important value, but no
more.
1TRoth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485
(1957).

necessary for, and reasonably adopted to, the

98
ion they may be, unless, under certain circumstances, they are excluded from protection because of their encroachment
upon the limited area of even more important social interests. But obscenity has always been regarded as utterance wholly
lacking any redeeming social importance.
There is really universal agreement that
obscenity should be restrained, as witness
the International Agreement for the Suppression of the Circulation of Obscene
Publications signed by over fifty nations
including our own, and as witness the statutory obscenity controls in all our states,
and in the federal government from 1842
to date.
And because obscene utterance is not
within the scope of first amendment protection, it is unnecessary to consider the
critical-danger qualification for utterance
which is so protected. Hence, no first
amendment constitutional guarantees are
violated merely because these convictions
were had without any proof that the obscene utterance would perceptibly create
a critical danger of antisocial conduct, or
has induced, or probably would induce,
such conduct.
To the secondary constitutional contention that there was no legal definition of
"obscene" sufficiently definite to meet the
requirement of due process in a criminal
proceeding, Mr. Justice Brennan held that
American case law had developed a sufficiently definite meaning, which lie stated
as follows: "Obscene material is material
which deals with sex in a manner appealThe Model
ing to prurient interest.""
Penal Code's definition of "prurient interest" as a "shameful or morbid interest in

s Id. at 487.
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nudity, sex or excretion" appears in a footnote.1"
Mr. Justice Brennan proceeded to say
that modern American cases had also formulated standards for determining obscenity which limit the concept so as adequately to safeguard the first amendmentprotected freedoms of speech and press
for material which deals with sex in a
manner which does not appeal to prurient interest. Certain standards initially
used by earlier English cases proved unduly restrictive of the protected freedoms
because they permitted material to be adjudged obscene merely by the effect of an
isolated excerpt on particularly susceptible
persons. But the present standards formulated by the modern American cases are
proper and may be expressed as follows:
the test of obscenity is whether, to the
average person, applying contemporary
community standards, the dominant theme
of the questioned material, taken as a
whole, appeals to prurient interest. These
standards make the concept "obscene" a
reasonably ascertainable norm for criminal
guilt, sufficiently precise to afford adequate
notice of what conduct is prohibited and
so not violative of due process, even
though there will be marginal cases wherein their application will be difficult. In
these present cases, however, the trial
courts followed the proper standards and

'9There was no significant difference, in Mr.
Justice Brennan's opinion, between this judicial
meaning of obscene and the definition tentatively
proposed in the American Law Institute's Model
Penal Code in these words: "A thing is obscene
if, considered as a whole, its predominant appeal
is to prurient interest . . . and if it goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in
description or representation of such matters."
Id. at 487 n.20.
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used the proper definition.2 0

Mr. Justice Douglas, for himself and
Mr. Justice Black, dissented chiefly because, under the standards of obscenity
accepted by the majority of the Court,
criminal punishment may be meted out to
a person for trafficking in a publication
which merely provokes lustful thoughts,
without any proof that those thoughts are
ever translated into overt antisocial conduct, which conduct alone constitutes the
proper area for governmental controls. No
one is even sure that sexually impure
thoughts do cause sexually impure antisocial actions. But in any event, public
control of the mere stimulation of sexual
thoughts or desires, apart from any objective antisocial conduct, can never justify
the social loss resulting from the interference with literary freedom which is
necessarily entailed. Government is to
20 The Chief Justice concurred in the result of
both cases, but stressed the point that the decisions should be narrowly construed to mean
merely that the government can constitutionally punish persons plainly engaged in the commercial exploitation of the morbid and shameful craving for materials with prurient effect.
Mr. Justice Harlan dissented in Roth but not
in Alberts because:
1. The federal government has no substantive
power over sexual morality. What powers it has
in that area are merely incidental to its power
over the mails and over foreign and interstate
commerce, whereas the state has direct plenary
police power over sexual morality.
2. The federal government is more immediately controlled by the first amendment guarantees of free speech and press than is a state. The
latter is so controlled only indirectly through the
substantive due process concept of ordered liberty in the fourteenth amendment.
3. Federal control of obscenity, involving, as
it would, one standard for the whole nation,
presents a real danger of a deadening uniformity,
which would be tolerable only for the worst
hard-core pornography, which was not the sort
of material involved in the Roth case.

concern itself with conduct, not with mere
utterances. Hence, freedom of expression
can be restrained only if, and to the extent
that, it is so closely brigaded with illegal
action as to be an inseparable part of it.
But, as to mere speech itself, freedom is
absolute. Nor is the constitutional test of
control of obscenity avoided by holding
that the obscene is not within the protection of the first amendment. Except for
the libelous utterance in the Beauharnais
v. Illinois case, 1 the Court has never resolved problems of free speech and press
by placing any form of expression beyond
the pale of the first amendment. And as
against the value of free expression, neither court nor community has any competence to judge that a mere expression
has no redeeming social importance; to
permit that is to permit judicial and community censorship.
The writer thinks that this dissent can
be understood to make this principal
point: While no showing of any critical
danger need be made in order to justify the
criminal restraint of obscene publications
(because the majority has held that the
obscene is not within the protection of the
first amendment), still some showing must
be made that the obscene exerts some adverse effect on the general welfare, because
there is no justification for any restrictive
legislation other than its contribution to
the common good. Hence, the constitutional guarantee of substantive due process
is the constitutional test now involved. In
this sense, the restraint must be "closely
brigaded with illegal action" in order to
meet that test.
On that understanding, the writer agrees
with the thrust of the dissent. But the diffi21 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
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culty then turns out to be that Mr. Justice
Douglas will accept, as proof that obscenity exerts a harmful effect on the general
welfare, objectively verified evidence only.
As he sees it, the great mass of opinion evidence (to the effect that obscenity
erodes and subverts public morality in the
long run, and so harms the general welfare
of society) is not probative, whether it
comes from experienced experts or from
the common man (who, the writer suggests, in this area of the practical moral
judgment, has the built-in competence of
a social conscience in a being social by
nature).
To summarize: Thanks to the Roth decision, we now know squarely for the first
time that neither federal nor state criminal regulation of obscene publications (as
obscene is therein defined and supplemented with standards) is inherently unconstitutional as a violation of first and
fourteenth amendment-protected freedoms
of speech and press. On the contrary: the
adjective "obscene," as defined and standardized, is sufficiently definite for constitutional use as a due process standard of
criminal liability; and obscene publications, as defined, are not within the protection of the first and fourteenth amendments, for which reason no showing of
any critical danger to the general welfare
need be made in order to justify the restraint of such publications through governmental control by postpublication
criminal prosecution.
The Roth-Alberts decision was a most
important turning point iri the modern law
of obscenity. But it also proved to be
merely the beginning of a continuing process of legal clarification which now became
necessary to enable one to understand and
to use the newly developed concept of the
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obscene. In the subsequent cases, the focus shifted to the question of whether the
definition and the standards of obscenity
had been correctly applied by the lower
courts to the questioned materials. It immediately became clear that, on this issue,
the United States Supreme Court would
make its own independent determination
by itself applying the definition and standards to the materials without permitting
the determinations of the lower courts to
influence its judgment at all. Three per
curiam reversals launched another series
of upsets of decisions of lower courts; all
simply cited the Roth-Alberts case. The
respective materials were the French film
"Game of Love,"22 an issue of the nudist
magazine Sunshine and Health,"2 and an
issue of a homosexual magazine called
24

One.

The case of Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp.
v. Regents of the University of New
York,2 though not an "obscene" case,
shed additional light on the approach of
the United States Supreme Court. This
case concerned the movie "Lady Chatterley's Lover." The New York Court of
Appeals decided that the film was not obscene; for that reason, it was still within
the protection of the first amendment.
Even as so protected, however, in alluringly portraying adultery as proper social
behavior and as right and desirable conduct for certain people under certain cir'"Times Film Corp. v. City ol' Chicago, 355
U.S. 35, reversing per curiam 244 F.2d 432 (7th
Cir. 1957).
23 Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 355 U.S.
372 (1958),

reversing per curiam 249 F.2d 114

(D.C. Cir. 1957).
24 One, Inc. v. Olesen, 355 U.S. 371 (1958),
reversing per ctrian

241

1957).
25 360 U.S. 684 (1959).

F.2d

772

(9th

Cir.
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cumstances, it violated a new provision of
New York's amended film licensing statute. That provision directed that no license be issued to films which presented
acts of sexual immorality, perversion, or
lewdness as being desirable, accepted or
proper patterns of behavior. The United
States Supreme Court reversed the New
York court on the ground that the standard of approvingly presenting an adulterous relationship without any reference to
the manner of its portrayal permitted exactly the type of censorship which the
first amendment was designed to prevent,
namely, censorship of the mere advocacy
of the idea that adultery under certain circumstances might be acceptable behavior,
without any effort to incite anyone to
adultery by the manner of presentation of
the idea. While, as stated above, the case
is not an "obscene" case, it is worth noting for its emphasis on the manner of presentation of an idea as a factor of controlling constitutional importance even for
material within the protection of the first
amendment.
The case is equally significant by reason of a concurring opinion by Mr. Justice
Frankfurter in which there is an effective
formulation of the "balancing" doctrine
which he had been developing in respect
of freedoms protected by the first amendment-a doctrine which Mr. Justice
Douglas and Mr. Justice Black view with
disapproval as a judicial effort to subject
first amendment freedoms to the limitations of reason rather than regarding them
as the absolute freedoms which the language of the amendment, taken literally,
would appear to establish that they are.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter said:
The real problem is the formulation of constitutionally allowable safeguards which so-

ciety may take against evil without impinging upon the necessary dependence of a
free society on the fullest scope of free expression.' "
27
The next case of Smith v. California
continued the succession of reversals for
laws purporting to control obscenity. This
case struck, not at a mere application of a
California statute to a particular problem,
but at the statute itself for its failure to require scienter as an essential element of a
bookseller's crime of possessing obscene
publications for sale in his bookshop. In
other words, to be constitutionally unobjectionable, a statute must require that the
person in possession of obscene publications know the contents of the publications,2 or be reasonably chargeable with
such knowledge, before he can constitutionally be convicted of the crime of possessing them. The reason is that criminal
liability without that added circumstance
would compel him to examine all his
books, and would make him fearful to exercise his freedom to stock the nonobscene,
which timidity would in turn limit the access of the general public to the nonobscene. In a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Frankfurter thought that the Court
owed the nation some idea of what the
Court meant by the scienter it required,
because to require too much scienterwould
make the legal control ineffective, whereas
to require too little would make the protection of normal freedom ineffective.

Id. at 694. Mr. Justice Frankfurter also noted
his view, which Mr. Justice Harlan shared, that
judges cannot escape the instance-by-instance,
case-by-case application of the due process
clause.
27361 U.S. 147 (1959).
21;

28 He must know, not that the contents are obscene, but simply what the contents are or what
their nature is.
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Mr. Justice Frankfurter also thought
that the defendant must be enabled effectively to defend on the ground that the
book in his shop was not in fact obscene.
To do that, he must be permitted to enlighten the trier of facts as to the contemporary community literary and moral
standards. And, in turn, to do that, he
must be permitted to introduce expert testimony as to what those standards are
(though not the expert's opinion as to the
ultimate fact of the obscenity of the material in question, because that would usurp
the proper function of the trier of facts).
There is no other way to avoid the objectionable result of having the trier himself
determine what those standards are on the
purely subjective basis of his own experience, if any, in the community. 2 9
The writer closes this almost unbroken
string of judicial detections of legislative
and executive faults with the case of Grove
Press, Inc. v. Christenberry,3 a 1960 decision of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit holding that the original, unexpurgated edition of the book "Lady
Chatterley's Lover" could not be barred
from the mails because it was not obscene;
it did not, as a whole, predominantly appeal to prurient interest. By far the most
important aspect of the case was its position as to the scope of appellate review,
under the Federal Administrative Procedure Act, of an administrative determination of obscenity. The court held that it
could review the Post Office Department's
determination fully, both as to the law and
as to the facts (1) because the issue of ob29 Note that the size of the community may
easily become a very pertinent consideration; the
larger the community, the more difficult it will
be to determine its standards.
30 276 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1960).
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scenity was purely an issue of law, and
(2) because the "substantial evidence"
rule did not apply when, as in the Grove
Press case, there was no dispute as to what
the evidence was.
Judge Hoffman in the Federal District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois
had occasion in 1961 to wrestle with that
same problem in Big Table, Inc. v. Schraeder.3 1 That case held that an administrative determination of the Post Office Department that a quarterly magazine called
The Big Table was obscene and therefore
unmailable under Section 1461 of Title
18 of the United States Code, was not supported by substantial evidence in the administrative record as a whole, and must
be set aside. In reaching this holding,
Judge Hoffman had to decide what the
"substantial evidence" rule was in this setting. He began by ruling that, under the
Roth-Alberts decision, and despite Grove
Press to the contrary, the issue of obscenity is an issue of ultimate fact and not an
issue of law. This fact issue, moreover, is
not one as to which the Administrative
Procedure Act permits a de novo judicial
determination. Hence, even though no
dispute exists as to what the evidence is,
the reviewing court is bound, not indeed
by the administrative determination or
conclusion of the ultimate fact, but rather
by the existence of substantial evidence in
the administrative record as a whole which
supports that administrative determination
or conclusion. And "substantial evidence"
is such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support
the administrative conclusion. The judicial
review available under these conditions is
a full review, but it may not be a de novo
31

186 F. Supp. 254 (N.D. I11. 1960).
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finding of facts. Nor does the alleged denial of constitutional rights operate to enlarge the reviewing procedure in any respect. The Grove Press case appears to
misunderstand what the "substantial evidence" rule is when it finds the rule inapplicable simply because there is no dispute as to what the evidence is.
The primary evidence, Judge Hoffman
said, was the magazine itself. The need to
determine the dominant appeal of the magazine permitted evidence as to its literary
setting, but it was doubtful in his mind
whether any evidence of contemporary
community standards was admissible. The
hearing examiner had excluded any evidence of contemporary community standards, and Judge Hoffman refused to rule
that that exclusion was error. But the
absence of any such, evidence in the record was not a fatal defect, because it would
be presumed (in the absence of evidence
to the contrary) that the administrative
officer would, since he was legally required
to do so, make his determination in the
light of those standards, which (again in
the absence of evidence to the contrary)
he would further be presumed to know
and to respect from his very status as a
member of the community.
On this matter of the admissibility of
evidence as to contemporary standards,
the strongest position in favor of admitting
such evidence is that of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his concurring opinion in Smith v.
California: the Justice makes it a constitutional requirement of due process to
admit such evidence. 3 2 The 1959 case of
In further stating that the admissibility of expert testimony of contemporary community
standards was also a constitutional requirement
of due process, Mr. Justice Frankfurter did not
have the support of Mr. Justice Harlan, who saw
32

Poss v. Christenberry33 held by implication that such evidence was admissible,
but did not make its admissibility a constitutional requirement. The third view is
that such evidence is conclusory in nature
and therefore barred, because it usurps the
function of the trier of facts. As noted,
Judge Hoffman was doubtful as to the admissibility of such evidence and refused
to hold that the Post Office hearing examiner's exclusion of the evidence was
error.
The reader will note that the most
perplexing adjective problems are now
muddying the enforcement of obscenity
control laws, vying with the equally difficult substantive problems of the correct
application of the definition and standards
of obscenity. Coupled with the complexities of the definition and standards themselves, these are the reasons why the writer
suggests that the area for effective legal
control of obscenity exists, but is a very
narrow area. Should other states follow
the holding of a very recent New York
case that the word "obscene" in the New
York statute now encompasses "hard-core
pornography" only, the area will become
34
even narrower.
A few more cases must now be noted
which are as truly landmark cases as the
Roth-Alberts cases. They concern still
another complicating facet of the legal
problem of the valid control of obscenity:
the legality of particular methods of control. All relate to the celebrated 1931 case
of Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson,3" which
no need to focus on any particular type of evidence. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 165
(1959) (concurring opinion).
33179 F. Supp. 411 (S.D.N.Y.
-

1959).

People v. Richmond County News, Inc., 9

N.Y.2d 578, 175 N.E.2d 681, 216 N.Y.S.2d 369

(1961).
35283 U.S. 697 (1931).
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held that an injunction against future issues of a publication, nine past issues of
which had carried criminal libels, was an
unconstitutional restraint of free press.
There can be no such restraint prior to
publication.
In Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown38 decided by the United States Supreme Court
in 1957 along with the Roth-Alberts cases,
the Court held that a New York injunctive
remedy against the sale or distribution of
obscene publications in New York was not
an unconstitutional prior restraint. The
New York statute provided for a quick
trial and judicial decision of the issue of
obscenity in the injunction proceeding; it
was also construed to authorize a temporary injunction pending the joinder of issue in the principal proceeding. Speaking
for the Court, Mr. Justice Frankfurter
thought that the practical impact on the
freedom of the distributor or retail dealer
was actually less drastic than the impact
of the traditional postpublication criminal
conviction.3 7 The absence of a jury in the
equitable action was not significant because in New York the sale or distribution of obscene materials is only a misdemeanor and in New York no jury trial
is available for misdemeanors; hence, the
defendant in the injunctive proceeding
could not have received a jury trial in the
traditional criminal proceeding either. In
dissent, Mr. Justice Brennan thought that
a jury trial should be a constitutional requirement in an obscenity case because a
jury finding on the issue of obscenity is so
especially apt as to be essential to due
process.

In the 1961 case of Times Film Corp. v.
City of Chicago,;" the United States Supreme Court held that a municipal ordinance which required the submission of all
films to public officials for viewing prior
to the issuance of a required license for
exhibition, with the proviso that no license
should be issued for certain types of films,
did not of itself impose an unconstitutional
prior restraint on free speech or free press.
For the majority, Mr. Justice Clark formulated the issue as being whether there
is a constitutional freedom to exhibit any
and every film at least once. The majority
held that there is no such freedom, with
the caveat that the answer was for movies
only. The Chief Justice wrote a vigorous
dissent (in which Justices Black, Douglas,
and Brennan joined) to the effect that the
majority had accepted censorship in its
most objectionable form of administrative
licensing, and had done so without any
showing of a reasonable necessity for this
3 9
most dangerous method of control.
But each of these cases has already been
refined by still later cases which point up
vulnerable aspects of each basically constitutional method of control.

a,; 354 U.S. 436 (1957).

which the United States Supreme Court then refused to review. 368 U.S. 897. There is, of
course, no inconsistency whatever between this
refusal to review and the holding in Times Film

postpublication criminal conviction is a
criminal sentence with jail term and probation
on the condition that defendant cease publication of obscene materials. Id. at 444.
37A

For the earlier holding
of the Illinois Supreme Court on the over-all
:. 365 U.S. 43 (1961).

constitutionality of the Chicago ordinance in a
case which was not taken to the United States
Supreme Court, see American Civil Liberties
Union v. City of Chicago, 3 11. 2d 334, 121
N.E.2d 585 (1954).
3 Note the very recent holding of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in William Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Dana, 405 Pa. 83, 173 A.2d 59
(1961) that the Pennsylvania state censorship
of films violated the Pennsylvania constitution as
well as the United States Constitution, a decision

Corp.
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In Zenith Int'l Film Corp. v. City of
Chicago, "" the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit ordered the District Court
to grant a mandatory injunction for the
issuance of a license to exhibit the film
"The Lovers" in Chicago unless the City
immediately afforded certain procedural
safeguards in the operation of its film licensing process. Specifically, there must
be a full hearing at the administrative level
which will let the petitioner show that the
film does not offend contemporary community standards. In addition, the only
viewing of the film as a whole in the entire
administrative process had been by a Film
Censor Board, for which Board the ordinance made no express provision, so that
there were no standards for the selection
of the personnel of the Board and no requirement that the Board give any reasons for its administrative determination.
The court noted especially that the United
States Supreme Court in the Times Film
case had not approved the standards established by the ordinance for the denial
of a license, thus hinting at another area
of vulnerability in addition to that of procedural due process. 4'
In State ex rel. Beil v. Mahoning Valley
Distrib. Agency, Inc.,'2 an Ohio Court of
Common Pleas construed, and upheld as
construed, an Ohio statute like that of New
York establishing an injunctive remedy
and expressly including authorization for
a temporary restraining order against sale
and distribution in Ohio pending the quick

"'291 F.2d 785, rei'ersing 183 F. Supp. 623
1960).
(N.D. Ill.
-,1
The city of Chicago has just adopted an
amended ordinance on licensing movies designed
to meet the objections of (he Court of Appeals
in the Zenith decision.
42 169 N.E.2d 48 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1960).

judicial determination of the obscenity of
the materials. At the request of the prosecutor, the temporary order may be issued
by the court forthwith and without bond;
in this respect, the statute lacks New
York's provision for preliminary notice
(and, presumably, hearing). The Ohio
statute also goes a step beyond the New
York statute by adding a provision designed to permit Ohio to get jurisdiction
over corporations foreign to Ohio, and
not authorized to do business in Ohio,
which nevertheless distribute, or publish
for distribution, into Ohio printed materials for sale at retail in Ohio."' The court
held that neither the temporary restraining
order nor the permanent injunction constituted an unconstitutional prior restraint.
The court, incidentally, found a special
problem in Ohio arising from the absence
of a jury trial in the injunctive proceeding.
In Ohio, the distribution of obscene materials is a felony, and not merely a misdemeanor as in New York. But, under the
Ohio constitution, a jury trial is required
for a felony only when the punishment may
be imprisonment, or a criminal fine in excess of fifty dollars. Since an injunction is
neither, the court held that the absence of
a jury trial was not fatal to the constitutionality of the statute.
In dictum, the court took pains to say
that, to the extent to which (if at all) the
statute purported to authorize an ex parte
issuance of the temporary order without a
43 The most interesting efforts to achieve jurisdiction over persons and corporations outside the
state, whose activities result in statutory violations within the state, is to be found in the Model
Obscenity Statute proposed by the American
Periodical Distributors' Association. This statute
as proposed, however, has such serious flaws that
the writer opposes its adoption in any state without extensive amendments.
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hearing and before the service of summons, it violated adjective due process.
Again, by way of dictum, 4' the court expressly left open the constitutionality of
the issuance of the temporary order even
after the service of process (including the
type of service provided for corporations)
and hearing. In addition, the court noted
that no issue had been raised as to the
statutory time limits on the judicial proceeding, and that the order for the seizure
and destruction of the copies of the publication (after the judicial determination of
its obscenity and the entry of the permanent injunction) related solely to the existing copies of the publication and not to
copies, if any, published thereafter. The
dicta all point to actual or potential flaws
in a statute establishing the injunctive
method of control.
A third case, Marcus v. Search Warrant,45 is important because it struck down
a Missouri statute attempting to establish
a collateral method of control, and because it contains a penetrating discussion
of the New York injunctive method. Under the Missouri statute, a complainant
seeking a warrant to search for and to seize
obscene material files ex parte a sworn
complaint with a judge or magistrate of a
court having original jurisdiction to try
criminal offenses. In the complaint he
alleges "positively and not upon information or belief" that obscene material is being held or kept for sale or distribution in
a described place within the territorial jurisdiction of the judge or magistrate, or he
alleges evidentiary facts from which the

44The issue did not arise, since the defendant
consented to the entry of an injunction pendente

lite.
45

367 U.S. 717 (1961).
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judge or magistrate determines the existence of probable cause to believe that obscene material is being so held or kept.
Thereupon, the judge or magistrate, without any preliminary hearing, shall issue a
search warrant directed to a peace officer
commanding him to search the described
place and to seize and bring before the
judge or magistrate the described personal
property. The descriptions must be of sufficient particularity to enable the peace
officer readily to ascertain and identify the
place and the material. The judge or magistrate must also then fix a date between
five and twenty days after the seizure for
a hearing to determine whether the seized
material is obscene. In the interim, the
peace officer retains possession of the
seized material. At the hearing, the owner
of the material may appear and defend.
Notice of the hearing is given by posting
a copy on the described place and by delivering a copy to any person claiming an
interest in the seized material whose name
is known either to the peace officer or to
the complainant, or by leaving a copy of
the notice with any member of such person's household over the age of fifteen
years. No time limit is fixed within which
the judge or magistrate must render his
decision after the hearing. Should the decision be that the material is obscene, the
judge or magistrate must order the material destroyed; should the decision be that
the material is not obscene, he must order
its return to its owner.
In Marcus, on complaint of a police officer "of his own knowledge" (after investigation but without the attachment of any
supporting materials) that obscene materials were being kept at described places
for sale and distribution, search warrants
were issued on October 10 by a circuit
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court judge. They were executed the same
day by seizing 11,000 copies of 280 publications. The judge fixed October 17 for
the hearing and continued it to October 23.
Timely motions to quash the evidence were
made on the grounds that the statutorily
authorized procedures violated the first
and fourteenth amendments of the federal
constitution because (1) the statute failed
to provide for any notice or hearing judicially to determine the obscenity of the
materials before their seizure, and (2)
since the personalty was described in the
warrants merely as obscene materials, the
peace officer serving the warrants necessarily had to make a determination of their
obscenity, whereas such determination is
constitutionally required to be made by a
judge only. At the hearing, the judge
found 100 of the 280 publications to be
obscene and 180 not to be obscene. On
appeal, the Missouri Supreme Court sustained the validity of the statute, ' 6 but the
United States Supreme Court reversed.
Mr. Justice Brennan's opinion for the
majority noted that the power of a state
to suppress obscenity and the fact that obscenity is not within the protection of the
first amendment does not mean that there
is no constitutional bar to any form of
practical exercise of that power which may
impinge upon the protection afforded by
the first amendment to the nonobscene.
Specifically, this Missouri statutory procedure lacked the safeguards which due
process demands to assure nonobscene
publications the constitutional protection
which they enjoy. The search warrants
were issued on mere conclusory allegations
of a single complainant without any inde-

46 Search Warrant v. Marcus, 334 S.W.2d 119 (1960).

Mo. App.

-,

pendent judicial scrutiny or supervision.
Moreover, the warrants were general in
describing the personalty merely as obscene materials and in failing to specify
any particular publications. The determination of what is legally obscene is a
very complex judgment, which was here
sought to be made by peace officers without any guides, standards, or special qualifications as to hundreds of publications on
the spot; the result, as later judicially determined, was an interference with 180
nonobscene publications for two months.
Mr. Justice Brennan then pointed out
that the Missouri procedure as a collateral
method of control of obscenity was readily
distinguishable from the New York injunctive method of control basically approved in Kingsley Books, Inc., because
the New York method provided the very
procedural safeguards which the Missouri
method lacked. The New York complaint
named a particular publication and attached a copy, and the temporary restraining order (as well as the permanent injunction) ran against that named publication
only. In Missouri, the complaint merely
described the personalty as obscene materials, no copies were attached, and the
warrants authorized the seizure of all obscene publications found in the described
place. In New York, there was no interim
seizure of the materials; and if the defendant (as he had the capacity to do) violated the temporary restraining order,
there is no New York decision holding that
such conduct could not then be defended
by a subsequent judicial determination
that the publication was not in fact obscene. Hence, in New York there is no
impairment of public access to, and constitutional protection of, the nonobscene
in the interim between the issuance of
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the temporary restraining order and' the
final judicial determination. In Missouri,
the defendant's materials were taken away
from him prior to any judicial determination of their obscenity, and he could not
act in the interim, nor could the public
have access to the materials in the interim.
In addition, the Missouri statute lacks any
time requirement for the prompt rendering of the judicial decision.

7

This survey of cases on the law of obscenity throughout the past decade demonstrates that the key cases establishing
the very restricted area of constitutional
legal control which presently exists are
Roth-Alberts, Times Film Corp., and
Kingsley Books, Inc. Roth-Alberts is the
basic case; it established that the adjective
"obscene" was constitutionally definite as
a basis for the customary method of legal
control through postpublication criminal
liability, and that the obscene, as defined
and standardized, was not within the protection of the first and fourteenth amendments to the federal constitution. Kingsley
Books and Times Film established the basic federal constitutionality of two other
specific methods of controlling the obscene: the injunctive method of New York
for publications, and the film licensing
method of Chicago. At the same time,
very stringent limitations have been imposed on all these constitutionally valid

47Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas
concurred in a separate opinion which rested
upon the grounds that general search warrants
violate the fourth amendment, that the limitations of the fourth amendment have been imposed upon the states by the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment, and that the federal exclusionary rule as to evidence illegally
seized has been extended to the states as a constitutional requirement.
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methods of legal control by the independent successive judgments of trial and appellate courts as to the proper application
of the complex definition and standards
of obscenity to specific questioned materials, by the strong emphasis on adjective
due process in all the methods of control
and on the necessity for procedural safeguards for the nonobscene, by the requirement of scienter, by the extension of strict
procedural safeguards to the issuance of
search warrants, and by the restriction of
the meaning of "obscene" in one state to
hard-core pornography only.
To the non-lawyers (and lawyers?) who
think that judges and lawyers have gone
much too far in hamstringing legislatures
and executive officers and agencies in
their efforts legally to control a serious
social evil, this survey of cases may contribute understanding, if not reassurance.
On the other hand, the present state of
the law of obscenity is not without some
social compensations. Personal freedoms,
which are the key values in our society,
have been made more secure from governmental interference; and the method of
community pressure through voluntary
citizens' groups acting extralegally, but
not illegally, remains for development.
In this context the 1957 Annual Statement of the American Catholic Hierarchy
on Censorship48 stands as a statement truly
remarkable for its clarity, its moderation,
and its perception. The statement pointed
out that any governmental censorship necessarily impinges on the individual's freedom to communicate (which stems from
his basic right to know), and that this
freedom is absolutely essential to the development not only of the individual but
Is Reprinted in 56 CATHOLIC MINI) 180 (1958).
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of the democratic state. This freedom to
communicate, of course, has obvious social implications, which require that the
freedom be exercised within the limitations
imposed by the equal freedom of others
in society and by the general welfare. It
is inevitable, however, that legal restraints
on individual freedoms can be but minimal; civil law will define any limitation on
freedom as narrowly as possible, and the
limitation must clearly be necessary for
the common good. The American legal
system has always been dedicated to the
principle of minimal restraint-to curb
less rather than more, to hold for liberty
rather than for restraint. Thus do we best
safeguard our basic freedoms. It follows
that, owing to the exigencies of free
speech and free press, a communication

may not be legally punishable, but may
yet defy the moral standards of the great
majority of the community. Between the
legally punishable and the morally evil,
there is a great gap. To accept as morally
inoffensive all that is legally unpunishable
would be to lower greatly our moral
standards. Civil legislation of itself is not
an adequate standard of morality. It is
for this reason that we need private agencies to evaluate communications on the
basis of moral standards higher than those
practicable for civil law, and then to publicize their evaluations and to seek by legal means the cooperation of like-minded
persons in the vindication of their rights
as parents and citizens. The right, by legal
means, to speak out for good morals is
not challengeable in our democracy.

